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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines evidence on the partisanship of immigrants and second generation 
citizens as a first step in assessing the impact of recent compositional changes in the electorate. 
Drawing upon a sample of 574 Latino- and 308 Asian-Americans, we find that the longer Latino 
immigrants have been in the United States, the more likely they are to identify as Democrats and the 
more intensely they hold their partisan attachments. Asian immigrants, in contrast, exhibited no 
such trends in the direction of their party choice or in their partisan identity. We also find strong 
age-related gains in Democratic support and in partisan intensity among subsequent generations of 
Latinos. We strongly suspect that these too are experience-related, but we are not able to discount 
equally plausible cohort-based scenarios. 
THE EVOLUTION OF PARTISANSHIP AMONG IMMIGRANTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Successive waves of immigration into the United States have repeatedly altered the 
composition of the electorate and the patterns of party politics. The arrival of millions of Irish 
Catholics in the 1840s swelled the ranks of the Democratic party, but also catalyzed a nativist 
reaction. Traces of the resultant ethno-cultural cleavage in party support persist to this day. The 
electorate was transformed once again by the massive influx of Eastern and Southern Europeans 
which began in the last part of the 19th Century. These immigrants and their offspring formed the 
urban ethnic core of the New Deal coalition (Andersen, 1979, Petrocik, 1981). Major changes in 
policy enacted in the legislation of 1965 triggered another surge of immigration. The vast majority 
of recent immigrants come not from Europe, however, but rather from Asia, Mexico, and the rest of 
Latin America. As in the past, the addition of these new citizens could profoundly affect the partisan 
makeup of the U.S. electorate (Bean, Stephen and Opitz, 1985). The nature and magnitude of these 
political effects will depend upon several factors--the relative attractiveness of the two major parties 
to new citizens, the rate at which immigrants and their children develop partisan attachments, and 
the strength of these attachments. This paper examines evidence on the partisanship of immigrants 
and second generation citizens as a first step in assessing the impact upon American politics of the 
compositional changes in the electorate. 
Although a large body of recent research has focused on the political behavior of 
Mexican-Americans, and, to a much lesser extent, of Asians-Americans, there is very little in the 
way of previous research on the evolution of partisanship among immigrants. This is largely due to 
the fact that earlier waves of immigration preceded the advent of modem survey research. Not 
surprisingly, the one major survey study of immigrants undertaken in recent years (Black, Niemi, 
and Powell, 1987) was done in Canada, which has a higher proportion of naturalized citizens than 
any other advanced industrial democracy. Contrary to standard expectations that older people are 
more resistant to learning in a new political environment, this study of recent (i.e., within the last 5 
years) arrivals in Toronto found age to be positively related to the acquisition of partisanship and 
other indicators of political involvement. Because this survey was confined to recent arrivals, 
however, it did not examine hypotheses other than those relating to age and resistance. 
But mass electorates are continuously infused with another set of new voters--young people 
who have just reached the legal voting age. There has been substantial research on the acquisition of 
partisanship by young people and on the relationship between partisanship and age. Most notably, 
for many years public opinion surveys showed that the age of respondents was positively correlated 
with a) support for the Republican party, and b) more intense partisanship whatever its direction (see 
Campbell et. al., 1960, pp. 161-7). It has been argued that older people are more likely to identify as 
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Republicans because as people advance in years they tend to become wealthier, more cautious about 
expenditures, and more conservative. Another possibility, however, is that Americans who entered 
the electorate prior to the New Deal, when the Republican party was ascendant, might be 
permanently "imprinted" by their formative experiences in the political world. The correlation 
between age and Republicanism would thus simply reflect the fact that members of those cohorts 
were among the older groups of respondents at the time the surveys were taken. 
A positive association between age and the intensity of partisanship could similarly be 
accounted for as a cohort or generational effect. It is possible that older Americans entered the 
electorate during a time of greater partisan conflict, thus quickly became staunch partisans and 
remained that way over the course of their lifetime. Equally compelling are accounts based upon 
life-cycle experiential or learning effects; over time, people gather more information about the 
political parties, become increasingly aware of where their interests lie, and have spent more years 
reinforcing an initial attachment (a process possibly abetted by cognitive dissonance). 
Most researchers have now concluded that the age-Republicanism correlation was in fact 
largely the product of generational cohort differences (Abramson, 1983). Indeed, the present 
electorate contains so few voters who entered the electorate prior to the New Deal that this 
correlation has largely disappeared. Research in this area also indicates that the current era in 
American politics has been so corrosive to partisan loyalties in general that the positive correlation 
between age and strength of partisanship was confined to the years prior to 1964 (Glenn, 1972; 
Glenn and Hefner, 1972; Converse, 1976; Abramson, 1976, 1978, 1983). Abramson's work 
indicates that the patterns of change in both the strength and direction of partisanship have varied 
dramatically between blacks and whites-primarily because political events and conditions during 
the past several years have affected blacks and whites in very different ways. In light of these 
findings it behooves us in our current study of Latino- and Asian-Americans to be sensitive to the 
possibility that the patterns of partisan acquisition in the two groups could diverge in important 
ways. 
A major problem confronting research in this area is the observational equivalence of the 
two effects. In a single cross-section, age and cohort are identical; persons in their forties are not 
only at the same point in the life cycle, but also came of age politically at the same time. Age and 
cohort effects become increasin.gly decorrelated as additional observations are made, but examining 
a series of cross-sections introduces the additional problem of factoring out "period" effects, i.e. 
shocks which affect the entire distribution of the dependent variable at the time of a particular 
observation. Indeed, each one of the three effects-age, cohort, and period- is a linear combination 
of the other two, making the classic cohort analysis model under-identified and impossible to 
estimate unless some restrictions on parameters are imposed (Mason et al., 1973). According to 
Gler_.._.Tl {1976) even t.11.is esth111ation strategy is in tum badly compromised by t.11.e presence of higher 
order interaction effects, e.g. between age and period. Both he and Converse (1976) argue that a 
strong theoretical basis and/or "side information" is required if one is to decide between competing 
age, cohort, and period explanations. 1 
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So far we have discussed major hypotheses concerning the acquisition of partisanship 
primarily in terms of associations with age. But as Converse (1969) pointed out, "sheer time" or "the 
passage of years in chronological age" is really only a proxy for how much exposure an individual 
has had to the the political environment. Because immigrants enter the United States at different 
ages, a major analytical advantage we enjoy in this study is that the amount of exposure they have 
had to American politics is distinct from their chronological age.2 In our dataset there were 
respondents who were children when they arrived and others who were in their sixties. By studying 
the evolution of partisanship among immigrants we are thus able to use a far more direct indicator of 
exposure (years in the United States) than is otherwise the case. However, our data do not allow us 
to escape from the difficulties of disentangling effects due to intercohort differences from those due 
to differences in amount of experience and learning. Whenever our findings admit to both 
possibilities we will so indicate, and simply report reasons why we find one or the other more 
plausible. 
We will proceed by first outlining a general model of partisan attachments developed by 
Fiorina (1981). Many of the hypotheses we derive from this model are analogous to those upon 
which the field of cohort analysis usually has focused. Do immigrants tend to gravitate toward one 
party and away from the other? Does the strength of their partisan attachments increase the longer 
they live in the United States? Are the partisan predilections of immigrants especially affected by 
the political climate in the United States at the time of their arrival? Do second generation 
Americans display different patterns in the direction and strength of their party ties? Throughout, we 
assess whether the factors that facilitate or retard the acquisition of partisanship among immigrants 
and their children are similar to those that affect partisanship in the electorate generally. 
The data on which our analyses are based are drawn from a statewide survey of Californians 
undertaken in late 1984. Although large numbers of Latin and Asian immigrants have settled in 
several states, their impact has been felt most dramatically in California. Indeed, the proportion of 
the state's population made up non-Hispanic whites is expected to fall from the 67 percent figure of 
1980 to less than half by 2010. Additional details on the sa.mpling design, which yielded completed 
interviews with 574 Latinos, 308 Asian-Americans, 335 blacks, and 317 non-Hispanic whites, are 
reported in Appendix A. The utility of these data for our inquiry derives in part from the large 
number of immigrants and children of immigrants. The Latino subsample contained 213 immigrants 
and 152 second generation citizens. The corresponding figures for the Asian subsample were 174 and 
63. For ease of exposition we will henceforth refer to "Asians" when we mean Asian-Americans,
"Mexicans" when we mean Mexican-Americans, "whites" when we mean non-Hispanic whites, and 
so forth. 
The evolution of partisanship among immigrants should be considered within the context of 
a more general model of party identification. While there are a number of such models, they differ 
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less in what they identify as the basic determinants of partisanship than they do in the relative weight 
assigned to each cause. The social psychological model of party identification tends to emphasize 
the importance of parental socialization, to downplay the role of short-term forces, and to regard 
partisanship as a cognitive filter (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960). Rational choice 
models tend to emphasize how ongoing information relevant to the performance of parties in office 
is incorporated into cumulative, running evaluations of the parties (Downs, 1957). As our intent is 
not to choose among models of partisanship but rather to use some reasonable model to guide our 
investigation, we find most useful for this purpose the synthetic formulation provided by Fiorina 
(1981). Fiorina posits that individual i's evaluation of party q (or, if one prefers, i's party 
identification) can be expressed as the comparison of past political experiences (PPE) that the 
individual has had with party q versus those he/she has had with party z, plus a vector G, composed 
of various inherited biases such as parental party identification. This he expresses as: 
(!) PID;' = PPE,' -PPE[ + G; 
where: PID,• is individual i's evaluation of (or identification with) party q. 
PPE1•,PPE;' are the past political experiences of individual i with parties q and z, 
respectively. 
G1 is a vector of inherited biases inherited from one's family, etc. 
A great deal of research has shown the importance of parental transmission of party identification 
(Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954, p. 99; Butler and Stokes, 1974; Jennings and Niemi, 1974, pp. 
37-62). Individuals whose parents were non-partisan are more likely, all else equal, to be 
non-partisan themselves as adults. Familial partisanship as captured in the model by the G vector 
corresponds to setting an initial value for the individual's party identification at the time of his or her 
entry into the electorate, which is then modified by the cumulated political experiences. 
The retrospective PPEs ca.� furt.lier be defined as the weighted, discounted sum of utilities 
the parties have provided the voter in the past. Fiorina expresses this term as: 
• 
(2) PPE,'= L s11a11[u;•J+I - u;1J
j=l 
where s,1 is the time discount for past experiences. 
a,1 is the importance assigned to each experience. 
u", u1)+1 is the utility of the party q's action or policy position at time j or j+i.
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The PPE component thus reflects the impact of all previous pieces of information relevant to 
party choice that individuals have acquired after their entry into the electorate. Although much of 
this information may be picked up through direct personal experiences with such things as  
unemployment, inflation, crime, military service (see Downs, 1957), i t  also includes the impact of 
information acquired vicariously from the news media, friends and neighbors, trusted reference 
groups, etc. The amount of importance assigned to each piece of political information is no doubt 
highly idiosyncratic. We would expect, though, that as immigrants' economic and psychological 
stakes in the U.S. increase and their sense of attachment to the old country correspondingly 
decreases, more weight will be afforded to the information they accumulate. 
The Fiorina model thus provides an explicit theoretical basis for the basic hypotheses which 
have been examined in cohort analyses of partisanship. Converse's (1976) hypothesis that the 
strength of partisanship increased with age (at least during the pre-1965 "steady state" period) can be 
derived from this framework by recognizing that over time an individual accumulates an increasing 
number of observations about how the parties behave in office and how those actions affect his or her 
welfare. In terms of the rules of Bayesian inference, these past political experiences come to shape a 
statistical prior and subsequent observations produce a posterior updating of that prior. If the parties 
act consistently over time and an individual's circumstances (and hence preferences) do not alter too 
drastically, then as the number of observations accumulate, new observations will be offset by past 
information and will be less likely to perturb a person's basic partisan orientation. Over time a 
person's partisan attachments thus become stronger and more resistant to change. 
Cohort or generational effects can be derived similarly. As pointed out above, younger 
voters have fewer observations of the competing political parties, and so rely primarily on the 
inherited prejudices of their family and background-the elements of the vector G in the 
retrospective model. As a consequence, they will tend to have weaker priors and less stable party 
affiliations and will therefore be more susceptible to short-term influences. In other words, the 
events of the day will have a greater impact upon younger than upon older cohort groups, and they 
will be incorporated with a heavier weighting into t.1-ie political memor; of those younger voters. 
Because their retrospective experiences are shared, a particular cohort group may exhibit distinctive 
patterns of partisan preference throughout its political life cycle. 3 
How does the development of partisanship among immigrants differ from the case of 
native-born citizens? The first column in Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses about the relationship 
between generation (in this country) and family influence-a major component of the G vector of 
background characteristics and inherited predispositions. We expect that foreign-born Americans 
receive few relevant (i.e. U.S.) partisan cues from their parents and thus enter the electorate with 
virtually no inherited partisan bias. This is especially true of immigrants who do not arrive in this 
counti-y un.til they are adults. Faiuily political influence in the second generation, i.e., tl1ose bor:n ir1 
the U.S. of foreign-born parents, will vary substantially, depending on whether and when an 
individual's parents became politically engaged in the new country. If the parents themselves 
developed partisan attachments early in the offspring's childhood, then the same kind of 
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socialization experienced by individuals with native-born parents might be expected. If the parents 
never made the transition into U.S. political life, or if they did not do so until late in the offspring's 
childhood, then little or no parental partisanship would be transmitted. By the third generation, i.e., 
those whose parents were born in the U.S., the usual patterns of intergenerational transmission would 
apply. We should observe that the strength of partisanship increases with each successive generation 
as parental socialization effects become stronger and more pervasive. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The second column of Table 1 summarizes our expectations concerning the effect of past 
political experiences (the PPE term) upon partisanship. Few immigrants enter the country with any 
experience relevant to the choice between the Democrats and the Republicans. The longer someone 
has been in this country, however, the greater will be their accumulation of politically relevant 
experiences and the more likely they will be to have developed partisan attachments. In this sense, 
the effect of years in the U.S. upon immigrants is analogous to the effect of aging upon native-born 
Americans. 
It is also the case, as Table 2 makes clear, that over time immigrants come to have a greater 
stake in their new community: a good job, ownership of a home, and so forth. Important among 
these is a commitment to the new country, as indicated by, for example, taking out U.S. citizenship, 
or giving up the idea of returning to the home country to live. These stakes increase further in the 
case of second and third generations. Table 2 shows that immigrants and members of subsequent 
generations additionally acquire other material and intellectual resources which facilitate political 
attentiveness and political involvement, including more income, more education, and greater fluency 
with the English language.4 As indicated earlier, an increasing economic and psychological stake in 
their new life in the United States should increase the weight immigrants assign to new political 
information and thus have the effect of strengthening partisanship. 
[Table 2 about here] 
According to the Fiorina model, cohort or generational differences in partisanship arise 
because of the relatively greater impact of political experiences upon partisan attachments in the 
period of initial political exposure. Although among native-born citizens some political learning 
occurs in childhood and adolescence, serious political exposure usually begins at the time of entry 
into the electorate. Thus the "New Deal generation" refers to the cohort of voters who began voting 
during the Thirties and early Forties. The relatively high degree of support these voters give to the 
Democrats is seen to be a consequence of the ascendancy of the Democratic party during this period. 
Assigning immigrants to a particular cohort is more problematic. If they arrived as adults they 
would presUtTiably be strongly influenced by political conditions at the time of their ai1ival. Those 
who arrived as children, however, could be expected to be more like native Americans and pick up 
the imprint of the political state of affairs that obtained at the time of early adulthood. Our decision 
was thus to designate immigrants' cohorts in terms of the first presidential election in which they 
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would have been eligible to vote had they been citizens, whether they actually were citizens or not. 
III. THE DIRECTION OF PARTISANSHIP
Although the Fiorina model portrays party identification as a continuum of evaluations 
ranging from extreme support for one party to extreme support for the other, in order to better 
position our analyses in the context of previous research we too will differentiate between the 
direction of partisanship and the strength of partisanship. Respondents in our survey were thus asked 
the standard NES party identification questions which allowed us to classify them into one of the 
seven categories of partisanship, i.e., strong and weak identifiers of either party, independents 
"leaning" toward a party, and pure independents. 
Almost all national opinion polls that have isolated Latino respondents have found 
majorities preferring the Democratic party to the Republicans, but, because of the small number of 
Latino respondents contacted, the size of the Democrats' advantage varies considerably from one 
poll to the next. Surveys specifically targetted at Latinos, however, have generally revealed a large 
3-1 to 5-1 advantage among the primarily Mexican-origin Latinos of Texas and California, while 
Cuban-Americans, concentrated in Florida and the Eastern seaboard, are overwhelmingly supportive 
of the Republicans (see several of the articles in de la Garza, 1987). More detailed analyses of 
Latino public opinion reveal that the appeal of the Democratic party is a function of its more 
congenial positions on immigration, language, and educational issues, and from its image as the 
party of disadvantaged minorities. Republicans' success among Cuban-Americans, on the other 
hand, arises primarily from the perception that they are more anti---<:ommunist and anti-Castro. 
Evidence on the partisanship of Asians is harder to come by. National surveys never contact 
more than a handful of Asian respondents. As we reported in an earlier study, however, our data 
indicate that in California in 1984 the percentage of Asian respondents identifying as Republicans 
and the percentage identifying as Democrats were nearly identical (Cain and Kiewiet, 1987). 
Republican support among Asians was associated with a number of factors, including the relative 
conservatism of Asians on crime and other social issues, opposition to welfare spending, and support 
for defense spending. Also, as indicated previously in Table 2, Latinos have made steady economic 
progress in the United States but Asian immigrants and subsequent generations of Asians have done 
even better. As a result, the Democratic party, which for the past several decades has been relatively 
more supportive than the Republicans of policies favoring lower income, disadvantaged groups, 
would have less appeal to Asian-Americans. 
Our concern here, however, is the dynamics of partisanship. Figures 1 and 2 report the 
percentages, by generation, of Latino and Asia11 respondents respectively who identified tl1cmsclves 
as Democrats, Republicans, or as Independents. The percentages for immigrants were in turn broken 
down into three categories defined by how long the respondent had lived in the United States; i.e., 7 
years or less, 8 to 15 years, or 16 years or more. If Latino immigrants come to acquire the 
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characteristics and preferences of native-born Latinos, then we would expect that the longer they are 
here (or, more precisely, as they gather more political information over time), the more they should 
come to resemble native-born Latino voters. Because Asians show no clear preference for one party 
as opposed to the other, there is no reason why Asian immigrants should with time increasingly 
favor one party or the other. Thus, as expected, the two figures present very different patterns. 
Asian immigrants who have been in the U.S. for a long time appear to be less supportive of the 
Republicans than new arrivals, but then the propensity to identify as a Republican (and not as an 
Independent) increases in the second and third generations. In contrast, Democratic identification 
among Latino immigrants increases rapidly with time spent in the United States, while the 
percentage of Republican identifiers falls. The propensity to choose the Democrats instead of the 
Republicans is in tum higher among second generation Latinos, and the third generation is more 
Democratic still. 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
There is then, clear evidence of experience-related gains in Democratic identification among 
Latino immigrants, and some indication that these gains are amplified in subsequent generations-­
presumably by the effect of family socialization. These figures, however, provide no evidence on 
several other questions concerning the direction of party choice that we discussed earlier: (1) Do 
native-born Asians and Latinos exhibit age-related gains in Democratic or Republican 
identification? (2) Do either immigrant or native-born voters exhibit cohort effects due to the 
ascendancy of one of the parties at the time an individual enters the electorate, as in the case of New 
Deal Democrats? (3) How much of the relatively greater propensity of Asians to identify as 
Independents or Republicans is due to their more rapid rate of economic progress? To answer these 
questions we estimated the following equation: 
PID = aG + �G, + oC + yX + e 
where 
PID = the individual's reported identification as either a Democrat, Republican, or Independent.
Independents "leaning" toward a party were assigned to that party. 
G = a set of dummy variables indicating to which generation-first, second, third or later-the 
individual belonged. 
G, 
= generation-specific effects of political experience. For immigrants this was measured by the 
number of years they had spent in the United States. For subsequent generations this 
variable was their reported age. 
C = a dummy variable indicating that the first presidential election in which a native-born 
individual was eligible to vote was won by the Republican ca.rididate. 
C (lG) = a dummy variable indicating that the first U.S. election an immigrant experienced as an 
adult living in the United States was won by the Republican candidate. 
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X = a set of dummy variables indicating that the individual was a member of a low income family ( 
< $15,000), a high income family ( > $50,000), that there was a union member in the 
household, or that the head of the household had been unemployed during the past year. 
The nature of the dependent variable (Democrat, Independent, Republican) indicated that 
this equation be estimated as a trichotomous ordered probit. Results are reported in Table 3. The 
top number in each entry is the estimated probit coefficient, the bottom number the standard error. 
Estimates significant at the p < .05 level are indicated by daggers. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Perhaps the most important finding in Table 3 is that income, experience with 
unemployment, and belonging to a union have little to do with the difference between Latino and 
Asian respondents' identification with the Republican versus the Democratic party. It is true that 
lower income Latinos and and those in union households are more likely to be Democrats, but these 
effects are not present among the Asians. Nor is there any evidence among Asians of a learning 
effect, i.e., a tendency to move toward either of the parties over time. In fact, the only variable 
which accounts significantly for the party choice of Asians is being an immigrant. As indicated 
earlier, most of the Asian immigrants in our sample came from nations which have either been 
involved in a war against a communist country or experienced an internal communist insurrection. 
More precisely, 44 percent were from Korea, 18 percent were from the Philippines, 13 percent from 
Taiwan, and 10 percent from Indochina. The Asian immigrants overall split 43 to 30 percent in 
favor of the Republicans over the Democrats. By comparison, native-born Asians, of whom more 
than half claim Japanese ancestry, favor the Democrats over the Republicans by 43 percent to 37 
percent 
The immigrant group is also more likely to favor increased military spending-40 percent in 
favor, 32 percent opposed-tha.n the native-born, 57 percent of whom oppose increases (32 percent 
in favor). Moreover, position on military spending is strongly related to party choice for the 
immigrants, while it has virtually no effect for the native born. Of the immigrants who favor 
increased spending, 60 percent are Republican and 17 percent Democrats. Of those who oppose 
increases, 25 percent are Republican and 54 percent Democrats. The corresponding figures for the 
native born are 35 to 47 for those who favor and 38 to 43 for those who oppose. Thus we believe 
that the high degree of Republicanism among Asian immigrants is rooted in the same 
anti--i:ommunist, pro-defense stance that is present in the Cuban-American community. 
Turning next to the Latinos, the constants for each generation indicate that the immigrants 
start out the least likely to identify \vit..11. the Democrats, with young members of the third generation 
the most likely to do so. It is also the case that the greater the number of years immigrants have 
spent in the United States, the more likely they are to identify as Democrats. In addition to the 
hypothesized effects of the class-related variables, we see that older members of each of the second 
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and third generations are significantly more likely than the younger ones to call themselves 
Democrats. These age-related effects are consistent with those found by Brischetto (1987) for 
Mexican-Americans in Texas. 
How can we interpret these findings? For the second and third generation Latinos, we 
cannot immediately distinguish between a cohort and a life-cycle explanation. The older second and 
third generation respondents all came of age at the same time point, and may have been influenced 
by partisan events at the time. In fact, when we introduce a dummy variable for persons who came 
of age during the New Deal (in an estimation not reported here), we do find New Deal voters to be 
more strongly Democratic. However, the fact that our dummy variables for the party which won the 
first election in which the voter was eligible are so small and insignificant suggests that most of our 
respondents were not simply swept by the partisan tides of their first election. It was also suggested 
to us that since our sample is restricted to California, the age-related effect may reflect the fact that 
older Latinos are disproportionately transplanted Texans or Arizonans--states with a strong 
Democratic tradition among Latinos. Since we did ask U.S. born respondents about their state of 
birth, we were able to examine th is hypothesis, and to reject it; native Californian Latinos appear to 
be as Democratic at a given age as those transplanted from Texas. Nonetheless, we cannot dismiss 
the possibility of a cohort effect, stemming from more subtle changes over time in the attractiveness 
of the two parties to new Latino voters. We can be confident that the effect is not simply due to 
changing economic circumstances for Latinos, as these effects have been specified in the equation 
we estimated. 
If the increasing Democratic identification with age among second and third generation 
respondents were due to a life-cycle phenomenon, what fonn might it take? Referring back to 
Fionna's model, what might make credible the notion that accumulated PPEs (past political 
experiences) would increasingly favor the choice of the Democratic Party by Latinos? Put another 
way, why would it be that as Latinos age their concerns and experiences make the Democrats 
increasingly attractive? One possibility is that as Latinos advance professionally their encounters 
with prejudice increase, so the protection of minority rights is more salient to someone middle-aged 
than to someone entering the electorate.5 A second (not contradictory) possibility is that as Latinos 
age their concerns become more focused on those with which the Democratic Party is identified. 
Opinion surveys have repeatedly found Latinos to be particularly concerned about education as an 
issue. Such concerns become more salient to persons who are older, and have children old enough 
for school. Thus it is plausible that the increase in Democratic identification with age among the 
native born reflects a life-cycle process. Without further infonnation it is equally as plausible that 
the effect reflects cohort differences, or some combination of the two effects. With the passage of 
several more years of time we will be able to make a more infonned choice between these 
possibilities. 
The immigrant generation presents a different type of puzzle, as here we do have substantial 
"side infonnation." The immigrants entered the U.S. at different ages. We thus can dismiss any 
explanation that depends upon the actual age of the individual, such as those which posit age-related 
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resistance or openness to new information. We did estimate other forms of the model in which age, 
rather than years in the U.S., was the independent variable, and found mainly noise. When, on the 
other hand, it is assumed that immigrants achieve political consciousness when they arrived in the 
U.S., and thus that their political learning is proportional to the number of years which they have 
been in the country, we get the clear increases we reported in Table 3 in propensity to identify with 
the Democrats among those with more experience. 
Again, a cohort explanation is also possible. All immigrants who have been in the U.S. for n 
years all entered the U.S. at the same time (in our case, 1984 - n). They might all have been 
imprinted with the dominant political mood of their time of entry, in a process similar to that 
proposed for native-born new voters when they enter the electorate. What evidence we have argues 
against this interpretation; the dummy variable reflecting the party which won the Presidency in the 
first election the immigrant would have been eligible to vote (had they been citizens) is insignificant. 
As before, if there is a cohort effect it is of a more subtle variety. 
For Latino immigrants, then, a learning process explanation seems much more compelling 
than the alternatives. When someone newly arrives in the U.S. their first choice of party may be 
virtually random. With time, and the accumulation of experience, the choice will be more likely to 
be "correct." One important source of experience for everyone are personal contacts. Personal 
interaction yields information. In particular, it has been argued (Johnston, 1985) that each encounter 
with someone of a different party has a certain probability of changing one's own identification, 
while encounters with persons of like party reinforce your own identification. Since Latino 
immigrants settle in large numbers in communities with other Latinos, they have substantial 
opportunity to learn over time that the Democrats are the "correct" choice. Thus, our data provide 
evidence for a learning model of party choice. 
We hasten to add one last caveat. Our data do not permit us to predict the future direction of 
Latino partisanship with any confidence. If the higher degree of Republicanism among younger, 
native-born Latinos reflects a cohort effect, then two implications follow. First, these Latinos will 
remain more Republican as they age. Second, new arrivals will more likely see the Republican party 
as the "correct" party for persons like them. The net result would be a decline in support for the 
Democrats among Latinos. In any case, however, should either party shift its image sufficiently to 
attract or repel large numbers of Latinos (for example, on policy grounds), t.hen one might expect a 
realigmnent, overriding the current patterns and in tum engendering a new set of cohort effect 
findings for party choice. 
III. STRENGTH OF PARTISANSHIP
The second characteristic of pa..�sai"'1ship \Ve consider js its strength or intensity. Strongly 
partisan voters are more likely to turn out to the polls and exhibit a greater degree of voter loyalty 
(Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960). In our earlier 
discussion, two expectations about the pattern of partisan strength were derived from the Fiorina 
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framework. First, partisan attachments, regardless of their direction, should grow stronger the longer 
the time an immigrant has been in the U.S. This follows from the cumulative nature of the PPE"
and PPE '• terms. As more observations are acquired of the Democratic and Republican parties,
uncertainty about what the parties stand for and how their positions affect the voter's utility lessens 
and the propensity to identify with one party rather than the other increases. Secondly, the model 
indicates that the effect of family socialization factors should be virtually zero in the immigrant 
generation, stronger in the second generation, and stronger still in the third and subsequent 
generations. If this model is correct, we should observe that the percentage of party identifiers, and 
the percentage of strong identifiers among the identifiers, also increases with each successive 
generation. Increases in politically relevant resources-fluency with English, citizenship, education, 
etc.-and in one's stake in the United States (owning a home, having a good job, deciding to stay in 
the United States for good) should also contribute to these trends by increasing the amount of weight 
afforded to political information. 
Figure 3 plots the proportion of Independents (both leaners and pure independents) 
according to number of years spent in the U.S. for immigrants and also by subsequent generations. 
These data show that for both Asians and Latinos the percentage of those who fail to identify with a 
party decreases with time spent in this country, and decreases farther among second and third 
generation respondents. A similar pattern appeared when we looked at the relative percentages of 
strong and weak identifiers. Some side evidence concerning the amount of politically relevant 
information respondents have acquired is plotted in Figure 4. After completing an interview our 
interviewers were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt the respondent was politically 
well-informed or not. Figure 4, which indicates the percentage of respondents in each category who 
were deemed to be "well informed" or "extremely well informed," shows marked increases in 
subjectively gauged information levels with time in the country. 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here J
There is, then, evidence of experience-related gains in partisan in.tensity among both Latino 
and Asian immigrants, as well as additional gains in mean intensity levels among subsequent 
generations. As before, we want to determine whether there are age-related gains in intensity among 
native-born Asians and Latinos. We also wanted to find out whether the greater intensity of 
subsequent generation individuals was due primarily to family socialization or to the increases in 
politically relevant resources that we had observed in Table 2. We therefore estimated the following 
equation: 
PSTN = rxG + �G, + oX +yY + e
where 
PSTN = the individual's strength of partisanship. Strong identifiers make up one category, weak
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identifiers and leaners another category, and pure Independents a third. 
G = a set of dummy variables indicating to which generation-first, second, third or later-the 
individual belonged. 
G, = generation-specific effects of political experience. For immigrants this was measured by the 
number of years they had spent in the United States. For subsequent generations this 
variable was their reported age. 
X = a pair of dummy variables indicating high and low levels of educational attainment, 
respectively. 
Y = a battery of dummy variables indicating greater perceived stake in the United States, including 
the acquisition of citizenship, whether or not English was used as a primary language, 
and whether or not the individual though he or she might return to their country of 
origin. 
As before, the nature of the dependent variable indicated that this equation be estimated as a 
trichotomous ordered probit. Results are reported in Table 4. The top number in each entry is the 
estimated probit coefficient, the bottom number the standard error. Estimates significant at the p < 
.05 level are indicated, as before, by daggers. The first column reports the estimates in a model 
which pools Asian and Latino respondents. The second and third columns report the estimates for 
Asians and Latinos, respectively, when each variable was dummied by respondent's ethnicity, thus 
allowing each parameter to assume a different value for the two groups. 
[Table 4 about here] 
As with the party direction results, we see that the intensity of partisanship among Latinos 
increases with age in the second and third generations, and that there are similar, experience-related 
gains observed among first generation Latinos. There were no such gains among Asians of any 
generation For whatever reason, the amount of politically relevant experiences acquired by Asians 
does not appear to increase �11.eir commitment to eitlier of th.e major parties. 
The findings in Table 4 also indicate that among Latinos it is an increase in intellectual 
resources (primarily more education) as well as a growth of one's commitment to the new 
country-measured by the attainment of citizenship and by giving up the idea of returning to the old 
country-that lead to more commitment to a political party. Retaining fluency in a foreign language, 
interestingly, was not important, ceteris paribus, in this respect. Once the effects of these variables 
were accounted for, there were no residual effects (presumably due to family socialization) 
associated with the generation dummies. 
Our abiiity to account for partisan intensity fullong Asiai'""iS was no greater t.11.a.."'l our ability to 
explain the direction of their choice. None of the many variables which were significant on the 
Latino side of the equation were significant for the Asian respondents. The large differences 
between Asians and Latinos in the acquisition of partisan intensity thus confirms the wisdom of 
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Abramson's (1983) recommendation not to conflate tbe political experiences of different ethnic 
groups. They are likely to be substantially different and to generate different patterns of partisan 
evolution. 
As in tbe case of our results on tbe direction of party choice, we cannot at tbe present time 
clearly choose between tbe two, equally plausible a priori alternatives of experience versus cohort 
effects producing tbe observed variations in strengtb of partisanship. However, tbe side information 
tbat level of knowledge goes up substantially witb time in tbe country, and tbat partisanship 
increases witb years for immigrants who arrived in tbe U.S. at a variety of ages, leads us to suspect 
tbat experience is tbe more likely explanation, at least for the immigrant respondents. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The results of our analyses indicate tbat the longer Latino immigrants have been in tbe 
United States, the more likely tbey are to identify as Democrats and tbe more intensely tbey hold 
their partisan attachments. Asian immigrants, in contrast, exhibited no such trends in the direction 
of tbeir party choice or in their partisan intensity. That they were somewhat more likely to be 
Republicans tban native-born Asians appears to be primarily a function of differences associated 
with their countries of origin. 
More intriguing were our findings of strong age-related gains in Democratic support and in 
partisan intensity among subsequent generations of Latinos. That tbey were similar in magnitude to 
the gains exhibited by Latino immigrants strongly suggests tbey tbey, too, are experience-related, 
but we are not able to discount equally plausible cohort-based scenarios, at least not until more time 
passes. 
The party identification model upon which our analysis was based predicts generational and 
learpi.11g effects a.mong immigrant groups for many of the same reasons that we have come to expect 
tbem among younger voters-- i.e. immigrants will have few relevant inherited family prejudices and 
will tend to weigh the observations of contemporary events more heavily than those who have been 
in the country for a number of years. By examining immigrants, we were able to disentangle some 
of the intertwined factors which confound studies of the acquisition of partisanship. Our evidence 
lends support to the argument that strong learning effects influence both the direction and intensity 
of partisanship, but tbat tbese processes are not universal. 
What can we predict about future political change among Asians and Latinos in tbe U.S.? 
Clearly, tbese two major inunigrant groups may well follow different partisan paths as a result of 
their divergent iJ1tcrests. Latinos appear to be more likely to follow the more traditional route of 
immigrants into tbe Democratic party, but Asians are inclined to split their support more evenly 
between the parties. These predilictions can be (and have been) influenced by short-run events and 
party strategies. If one party becomes strongly identified with the protection of nonwhite minorities 
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or becomes more strongly identified with prosperity, there could be important generational or cohort 
effects for the immigrants and shifts in the balance of preference between the parties. Should a 
strong alignment occur, learning processes will increase the numbers of partisans among those 
co-ethnics still to arrive. 
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APPENDIX: SAMPLE DESIGN 
The major problem we faced in designing the survey was that of efficiently reaching large 
numbers of Latinos and Asians, who, according to the 1980 Census, constituted 19% and 5% of the 
state population respectively. Because of their younger age structure the Latino percentage of adults 
is smaller than their percentages of the total population. Given a large enough budget we probably 
would have preferred an areal sampling framework and in-person interviews with respondents in 
their own homes. Most comparisons between in-person interviews and telephone interviews 
indicate that the former technique entails a lower refusal rate and less bias in the resultant sample of 
completed interviews. However, we worried that recent Asian and Latino arrivals, would be 
extremely suspicious of interviewers coming to their doors-especially if they were undocumented. 
Telephone interviews are less obtrusive and possibly preferable for that reason. The main reason we 
chose to do telephone interviews, however, was the extremely high cost of in-person interviews. 
With telephone interviewing the most common sample selection technique is random digit 
dialing. RDD is not without problems. In many areas there still exists some bias resulting from 
incomplete saturation of telephone ownership. And, although we have seen no reference to this 
problem in the literature on polling, we suspect that an increasingly important source of bias is the 
growing use of telephone answering machines to screen incoming phone calls. More serious, of 
course, is the unavoidable selection bias in any opinion survey resulting from the fact that 
participation is voluntary. Sample biases resulting from the differential incidence of telephone 
ownership and differential refusal rates are likely to be more serious in surveys in which minority 
group members constitute a large portion of the target population. Whatever the case, the virtues of 
sampling via random digit dialing have made it the standard choice in telephone surveys. 
However, RDD is an extremely inefficient method for contacting Latinos and Asians in 
California. Ideally one could draw a sample of telephone exchanges via probability weights which 
would yield the desired minority group proportions. If one were interested in oversampling blacks 
this technique would suffice. For Latinos and Asians, however, the high level of residential 
segregation and resultant strong correlation between telephone exchange areas and census units (the 
necessary demographic data are not available for telephone exchanges) which is needed for this 
technique to be effective simply do not exist. This problem is bad enough for contacting Latinos, 
but Asians are an extreme case in this regard. Of the 5050 census tracts in California in the 1980 
Census, only 33 (0.6%) were 40% or more Asian. Even if telephone exchanges could be weighted in 
a skewed enough fashion to increase significantly the probability of contacting Asian respondents the 
resultant sample would be problematic. Most blacks live in neighborhoods which are predominately 
black. The vast majolity of Asians, however, do not live in predominately Asian neighborhoods, and 
so a sample based primarily on those who do would likely be quite unrepresentative. 
Given these problems, we decided that the best way to generate Latino and Asian 
subsamples would be on the basis of surnames. We therefore began by randomly selecting a list of 
300 census tracts in California. Dia!America Corporation of Cleveland, Ohio provided us with the 
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names, current phone numbers, and addresses of 80-100 individuals per tract for approximately 90% 
of the tracts, thus yielding a list of24,523 names. We ran these through Hispanic and Asian surname 
dictionaries to derive our list of potential interviewees. In order to increase our sample of recent 
Asian immigrants we drew a supplemental sample of Korean surnames from the 1984 Korean 
Telephone Directory of Southern California. The creators of this directory believe that it contains 
the telephone numbers and addresses of over 75% of all Koreans in Southern California. We 
ultimately conducted interviews with 80 Korean-Americans via this supplemental sample. 
According to Leuthold and Scheele ( 1971), samples which are derived from telephone 
directories will, relative to RDD, undersample blacks, individuals who are separated or divorced, and 
city dwellers. As indicated earlier, however, we were more worried about refusal rates than other 
potential sources of bias. Our expectations of relatively high refusal rates were borne out; only 44% 
of the individuals we contacted agreed to an interview. Asians were more likely to refuse than were 
Latinos. 
Given the potential problems we faced, we were understandably interested in how well the 
characteristics of the people we interviewed matched up with data from the 1980 Census. The 
figures reported in Table 1 indicate that in some respects the individuals in our two subsamples were 
quite representative, while in other respects they were somewhat unrepresentative. In all four 
subsamples the reported figures for family income and country of birth were quite consistent with 
figures derived from the 1980 Census. There are , however, some discrepancies. The percentages of 
blacks and Latinos in our sample who reported being homeowners were higher than the Census 
figures. We also tended to oversample Asian men and black women. Reported education, though, 
was the source of the largest discrepancies. Individuals in all four subsamples were considerably 
more likely to report having attended college than the 1980 Census figures indicate should be the 
case. However, we are inclined to blame very little of the education bias we observed on our use of a 
telephone directory sample versus RDD. Warren Miller indicates that the sample of individuals 
interviewed in the 1984 Michigan Rolling Cross-section (which was a telephone survey) had a 
considerably higher average education than those interviewed in person in the traditional 
post-election survey. 
Because participation in opinion surveys is voluntary we believe that regardless of the 
sampling framework employed there is an irreducible element of self-selection bias generated by the 
differential propensity of different types of people to submit to the interview. In political polls this 
self-selection bias is naturally related to the extent to which the potential respondent is intellectually 
involved with political matters; people are more likely to talk to strangers about subjects they care 
about and know something about. This bias will yield us samples which are, compared to the 
population at large, more educated, more literate, more interested, and more knowledgeable about 
ongoi.11g political issues. �A:t.l-11y in.cidental bias derivi."lg from telephone director-1 versus RDD 
sampling was at least for us, apparently minimal. 
TABLE A.1 
COMPARISON OF SAMPLE AND CENSUS CHARACTERISTICS 
Latino Asian 
Percent Male 
Sample 1984 49% 60% 
Census 1980 51 48 
Percent Owner Occupiers 
Sample 1984 52 64 
Census 1980 44 62 
Family Income lOK 
Sample 1984 21 9 
Census 1980 27 14 
Family Income 10-25K 
Sample 1984 47 35 
Census 1980 48 37 
Family Income over 25K 
Sample 1984 32 56 
Census 1980 25 49 
Percent Native Born 
Sample 1984 60 38 
Census 1980 63 42 
Percent Some College 
or Greater 
Sample 1984 34 77 








Depends Upon Parental Political 
Involvement During Childhood 
Normal Pattern of Socialization 
Past Political 
Experiences (PPE) 
Increases with Time Spent in the U.S. 
Initial Experiences Especially Influential 
Increases with Age 
Increases with Age 
Table 2: Socioeconomic and Demographic Attributes of Latinos 
and Asians, by Generation 
Latinos 
Years in U.S. Second Third 
0--7 8-15 16+ Generation Generation 
% Citizens 1 1  22 48 
% Foreign Language 89 85 78 51 22 
% < High School 48 40 35 28 15 
% Low income 78 64 53 45 38 
% Renters 80 63 49 35 46 
n 46 88 89 152 162 
Asians 
Years in U.S. Second Third 
0--7 8-15 16+ Generation Generation 
% Citizens 12 64 86 
% Foreigrl Language 88 78 58 14 2 
% < High School 12 4 10 3 2 
% Low income 48 22 20 25 19 
% Renters 71 30. 32 19 33 
n 58 69 50 63 42 
Table 3: Party Choice Among Asian and Latino Respondents: The Effects 
of Cohort, Experience, and Economic Status 
Asians 
Immigrant Generation .93t 
(.27) 
Years in US, Immigrants -.009 
(.009) 
Second Generation -.09 
(.53) 
Age, Second Generation .008 
(.009) 
Third Generation -.26 
(.71) 
Age, Third Generation .014 
(.019) 
Republicans Won, Natives .28 
(.28) 
Republicans Won, Immigrants -.22 
(.23) 
Low Income Family -.05 
(.17) 




Unemployed Head -.31 
(.23) 
t = p < .05 
Log Likelihood Initial -829.6 
Log Likelihood at Convergence -773.3 


























Table 4: Partisan Intensity: The Effects of Political Experience 
and Increased Resources 
Pooled Asians Latinos 
Immigrant Generation .30 .39 .38t 
(.15) (.25) (.19) 
Years in U.S., Immigrants .Ol l t  .009 .Ol2t 
(.005) (.010) (.005) 
Second Generation .45t .46 .37t 
(.19) (.38) (.23) 
Age, Second Generation .006 .001 .01 1 
(.004) (.008) (.005) 
Third Generation .04 .56 -.07 
(.23) (.61) (.26) 
Age, Third Generation .026t -.001 .032t 
(.007) (.018) (.007) 
Citizen .26t .09 .36t 
(.13) (.21) (. 19) 
Foreign Language .02 -.21 .03 
(.10) (.20) (.12) 
Might Return -.17 . 1 1  -.36t 
(.14) (.22) (.18) 
Low Education -.10 .28 -.18 
(.10) (.32) (.12) 
High Education . 1 6  . 1 9  .24 
(.10) (.15) (.17) 
Owner .04 .23 -.02 
(.08) (.16) (. 1 1) 
Log Likelihood Initial -967.3 -967.3 
Log Likelihood at Convergence -796.1 -788.48 
Number of Observations 782 782 
Figure 1 :
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F001NOTES 
1 .  Converse ( 1969) recognized that one could cut cleanly through this analytical Gordian knot with 
data in which life-cycle or experience effects were not entangled with cohort effects. He reasoned 
that in the case of a new democracy holding elections for the first time citizens of all ages would 
have received equal (in this case, equally small) amounts of exposure to the political system. In 
other words, cohort effects would be held constant because everyone would be in the same cohort. 
After the passage of several decades age and cohort would once again be tightly intertwined. 
Barnes, McDonough, and Pina (1985) exploited just such a fortuity in examining the evolution of 
partisanship among voters in Spain just after the enactment of free democratic elections. A similar 
approach was followed in studies which examined the attitudes and behavior of groups who had 
been newly enfranchised in established electoral democracies (Niemi, Stanley and Evans, 1984; 
Niemi, Powell, Stanley and Evans, 1985). In both cases individuals of all ages exhibited increases in 
partisan intensity as a function of the length of time they had been enfranchised. In the case of the 
United States, however, elections were instituted a very long time ago, and the major group of 
recently enfranchised voters (Southern blacks) are not the subject of our study. 
2. We require only the assumption that immigrants have had no real exposure to U.S. party politics 
prior to their arrival. As salient as the United States is internationally, of course, it is possible that 
some immigrants will have rudimentary knowledge about American political parties at the time they 
enter the country. Doubtless this assumption would hold more strongly in the case of American 
emigres to other countries. 
3. This is what cohort analysts mean when they characterize generational effects as actually the 
interaction of period and life-cycle (Glenn, 1976). 
4. In Table 2 and throughout the remainder of the paper we use "third generation" as a shorthand for
third, fourth, and all subsequent generations. 
5. For example, Hispanic FBI agents recently claimed (and were upheld) that they had been 
discriminated against in job assignments as they attempted to move into supervisory positions. Of 
course, for this explanation to hold, the Democrats would have to be perceived as the party which 
was more protective of minority rights. 
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